The duty of clerks of courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely ministerial

The duty of clerks of courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely ministerial.  Although they may on inspection advise the parties or their counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to file, which may be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the filing party refuse to receive the same. (Ramos vs Teves, A.M. No. P-12-3061, June 27, 2012)

Mandatory twin requirements of a valid and effective cancellation under the Maceda Law

Under the Maceda Law, the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notarized notice of cancellation, and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. In other words, before a contract to sell can be validly and effectively cancelled, the seller has (1) to send a notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to refund the cash surrender value. Until and unless the seller complies with these twin mandatory requirements, the contract to sell between the parties remains valid and subsisting. Thus, the buyer has the right to continue occupying the property subject of the contract to sell, and may “still reinstate the contract by updating the account during the grace period and before the actual cancellation” of the contract. 

In this case, petitioner complied only with the first condition by sending a notarized notice of cancellation to the respondent-spouses. It failed, however, to refund the cash surrender value to the respondent-spouses. Thus, the Contract to Sell remains valid and subsisting and supposedly, respondent-spouses have the right to continue occupying the subject property. (Communities Cagayan Inc. vs Sps. Nanol, G.R. No. 176791, November 14, 2012)

The issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate civil suit and should not be confused with reconstitution proceedings

The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument or the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Its purpose is to have the title reproduced after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred and not to pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.  Possession of a lost certificate of title is not the same as ownership of the land covered by it, and the certificate does not vest ownership but merely evinces title over a particular property.  Indeed, registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

As pronounced by this Court in Lee v. Republic of the Philippines

[A] reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.  Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit.  Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

In the Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals the Court also explained that:

[I]n x x x reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title.  Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.  A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.  Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 [“Quieting of Title and Nullification and Cancellation of Title”] before Branch 74.  The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. (Heirs of Abadilla vs Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12, 2006)

Certification of publication issued by the National Printing Office is sufficient proof of publication as required in reconstitution cases

The jurisdictional requirements of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in Section 13 of R.A. No. 26, as follows:

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. . . . The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action and to give them ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Anent the publication requirement, R. A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. In the case at bench, private respondents were able to show both elements through the certification of the Director of the National Printing Office, a government official who enjoys the undisputed presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. We note that, on the other hand, mere submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would have evidenced only the first element.

Petitioner's reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous. What must be proved under Section 13, R. A. No. 26 is not the content of the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the hearing date.

This Court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. We have, on two separate occasions, adjudicated cases with factual backgrounds similar to the one at bench. In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking reconstitution did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in evidence, but merely relied on certifications comparable to the one at bench. In both cases, the granting of reconstitution by the trial court was reversed. But the reversals were not made on the basis of the failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They were, instead, both grounded on the fact — as clearly evidenced by the National Printing Office Director's certification — that the publications were made less than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no reason for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in reconstitution cases. (Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 101690 August 23, 1995)

Reconstitution of Title is an Action in Rem

Reconstitution of title under Republic Act No. 26 ("An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed") is an action in rem, which means it is one directed not only against particular persons, but against the thing itself. Its object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is binding theoretically upon the whole world. (Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 101690 August 23, 1995)

How the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved

● Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved by the following:

(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;

(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon, such opinion being an exception to the opinion rule;

(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine specimen thereof; and

(4) Expert evidence.

The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between the different means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person. It is likewise clear from the foregoing that courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.

● The passage of time and a person’s increase in age may have decisive influence in his handwriting characteristics. Thus, in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. As correctly found by the appellate court, the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did not conform to the foregoing standard. Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were on documents executed several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may involve characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1970. (Domingo vs Domingo, G.R. No. 150897, April 11, 2005)